American Indian Law Journal
Volume 9

Issue 1

Article 5

12-23-2020

THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT’S APPLICATION TO CIVIL
COMMITMENTS OF INDIAN CHILDREN IN STATE COURT
PROCEEDING
Courtney Lewis

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/ailj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Indigenous,
Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons

Recommended Citation
Lewis, Courtney (2020) "THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT’S APPLICATION TO CIVIL COMMITMENTS OF
INDIAN CHILDREN IN STATE COURT PROCEEDING," American Indian Law Journal: Vol. 9: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/ailj/vol9/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in American Indian Law Journal by
an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT’S APPLICATION TO CIVIL
COMMITMENTS OF INDIAN CHILDREN IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
By Courtney Lewis*

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 107
I. UNDERSTANDING TWO SILOED LEGAL PRACTICES: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AND
STATE COURT CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS ...................................................................... 107
A. ICWA .......................................................................................................................... 108
1. The Road to ICWA ......................................................................................... 108
2. What ICWA Is ................................................................................................ 110
3. When ICWA Does and Does Not Apply ........................................................ 111
4. What ICWA Does ........................................................................................... 113
5. ICWA’s Application in an Emergency ........................................................... 115
B. State Court Civil Commitment Proceedings............................................................... 117
1. The Road to Modern Civil Commitment Proceedings ................................... 117
2. The United States Supreme Court Issues Minimum Protective Standards for
Individuals Facing Civil Commitment................................................................ 118
a. Minimum Constitutional Federal Protective Standards for Adults ..... 119
b. Minimum Constitutional Federal Protective Standards for Children . 120
C. Siloed State Examples: Alaska and Washington ........................................................ 122
II. THE CURRENT SILOED PRACTICE: FAILING TO APPLY ICWA TO STATE COURT CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS OF INDIAN CHILDREN HARMS INDIAN FAMILIES AND TRIBES ........ 123
III. END THE SILO AND PROMOTE INTERDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE CONSISTENT WITH CONGRESS’S
INTENT TO PROTECT INDIAN FAMILIES AND TRIBES: APPLY ICWA TO STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
REGARDING CIVIL COMMITMENTS OF INDIAN CHILDREN ............................................................ 127
A. An Interdisciplinary Checklist for Practitioners in State Court Civil Commitment
Proceedings..................................................................................................................... 128
B. The Checklist in Action: The Four Initial Duties ....................................................... 129
*

Courtney Lewis is an assistant public defender at the Alaska Public Defender Agency. Ms. Lewis has represented
parents and children in child welfare cases since 2008 and has primarily focused on appeals since 2020. Ms. Lewis
has also represented individuals facing involuntary civil commitment. Ms. Lewis is the first person to be certified in
Alaska as a child welfare law specialist by the National Association of Counsel for Children. The author can be
contacted at courtneyrlewis@gmail.com.

105

C. The Checklist in Action: The Subsequent Duty to End the Emergency ...................... 129
D. The Checklist in Action: The Subsequent Duty to Ensure Removal Only Happens if a
Qualified Expert Witness Testifies .................................................................................. 131
IV. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................... 134

106

INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applies to civil commitments
of Indian children in state court proceedings. Practitioners familiar with ICWA and practitioners
who routinely address civil commitment proceedings do not necessarily overlap. Because these
two practices are often siloed, Indian children,1 their parents, and their tribes2 face a loss of rights
in the civil commitment proceedings that they are accorded through ICWA. This loss of rights can
result in the wrong legal outcome: the unnecessary physical removal of an Indian child from their
parents and tribe.
Part I of this Article discusses the history of ICWA and civil commitment proceedings.
State jurisprudence will have some variations, but Part I provides state examples of the siloed
nature of these two legal areas.
Part II highlights the current loss of rights experienced by Indian families and tribes.
Without clear guidance that ICWA applies to state civil commitment proceedings, practitioners
may erroneously separate an Indian child from their family and tribe.
Part III proposes a checklist for civil commitment practitioners. There are four initial duties
when determining ICWA’s application and ensuring ICWA’s basic legal tenets are met. Then,
depending on the Indian child’s situation, two subsequent duties may arise to ensure that an Indian
child is only removed from their parents as contemplated by ICWA. This checklist provides needed
support for ensuring compliance with these two important areas of the law.
I. UNDERSTANDING TWO SILOED LEGAL PRACTICES: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AND
STATE COURT CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
Before engaging in any legal analysis of ICWA or civil commitment law, it must first be
acknowledged that removing a child from their parents inherently causes trauma. 3 Removal can
result in long-term, serious health consequences for the child, including depression and a shorter
life span.4 As Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall cautioned, “What is the quality of your

This Article contains the anachronistic term “Indian child” to comport with the legally defined term in the Indian
Child Welfare Act. See 25 U.S.C. 1903(4) (2018). When the Article is not discussing the legally defined term found
in ICWA, it uses the current terms Native American, Alaska Native, and/or indigenous.
2
Instead of the current term indigenous nation, this Article contains the anachronistic term “tribe” to comport with
the legally defined term in the Indian Child Welfare Act. See 25 U.S.C. 1903(5), (8) (2018).
3
American Bar Association, “Trauma Caused by Separation of Children from Parents: A Tool to Help Lawyers”
(May 2019).
4
Sara Goydarzi, Separating Families May Cause Lifelong Health Damage, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (June 2018),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/separating-families-may-cause-lifelong-health-damage/
[https://perma.cc/Z8MC-BK8Y]. See also Marcia McNutt, Statement on Harmful Consequences of Separating
Families at the U.S. Border, NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES ENGINEERING MEDICINE (June 20, 2018),
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=06202018&_ga=2.2927672.960183307.15
30129958-713614449.1530129958 [https://perma.cc/UG3D-RULC]; Theo Liebmann, What’s Missing from Foster
Care Reform?: The Need for Comprehensive, Realistic, and Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 Hamline J. Pub.
L. & Pol’y 141 (2006).
1
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intent?”5 The trauma of removal must be given serious consideration because, regardless of
whether the intent is to help, which is a key principle in both child welfare and adolescent mental
health treatment, the removal will harm the child.6
To reduce harm, it is important to understand not just applicable laws and legal theories
but also their histories.7 Section A starts with a brief overview of why Congress enacted ICWA,
because the context is critical when considering ICWA’s application to legal cases involving
Indian children. Next, Section A provides an outline of what ICWA is, when it applies, and what
it does. Lastly, Section A addresses ICWA’s application in an emergency given that civil
commitment proceedings often begin as emergencies. Section B addresses civil commitment
proceedings, beginning with an abbreviated history of civil commitment. Since the minutiae of
most civil commitment jurisprudence will vary by state, Section B highlights the minimum federal
constitutional protective standards and provides two state examples of the siloed nature of ICWA
and civil commitment.
A. ICWA
1. The Road to ICWA
A historical understanding of how the United States treated Native Americans and Alaska
Natives is imperative to understand why Congress enacted ICWA, specifically when considering
ICWA’s application to different types of state court cases involving Indian children. Starting in
the late 1870s, the United States began sending Alaska Native and Native American children to
boarding schools.8 This educational policy was an attempt to assimilate indigenous children into
Western culture. Boarding schools needed to be far enough away to discourage families from
easily visiting their children, since family members would only hinder and detract from the goals
of assimilation.9
In addition to using distance as a tool to acculturate indigenous children, the United States
also used force.10 Authorities frequently told parents that the children must be sent to boarding

5

PRESS RELEASE, THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS
COMMEMORATES JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL’S 108TH BIRTHDAY (July 15, 2016), available at
https://www.usccr.gov/press/2016/PR_StatementThurgoodMarshall_071516.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM7X-4GC3].
6
DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON, 238 (Hardback ed., The New Press) 2019. (“[Acknowledgement] means
saying, even if we want to claim that we did not know the effects of mass incarceration would have …, that we
could have known, it was our responsibility to know, and we know now.”) This same logic applies to the harm
caused when a child is removed from their family, even if removal is meant to be temporary.
7
Id.
8
Jim La Belle, Boarding School: Historical Trauma among Alaska’s Native People, NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR AM.
INDIAN, ALASKA NATIVE, AND NATIVE HAWAIIAN ELDERS 2 (2005), available at
https://www.uaa.alaska.edu/academics/institutional-effectiveness/departments/center-for-advancing-facultyexcellence/_documents/boarding-school-historical-trauma-among-alaska-s-native-people.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PQ7-TGL5].
9
Id.
10
Id.
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school.11 Parents that did not comply were threatened with jail.12 Though some children had
positive experiences, many children reported that rampant abuse took place in boarding schools.13
Both Native Americans and Alaska Natives have come forward to discuss the physical, sexual,
and emotional abuse they experienced.14 They reported that they were not taught their Native
language, culture, or history at boarding school.15 The boarding school era ran through the 1970s.16
Another method of assimilating indigenous children was adoption. Between 1958 and
1967, the federal government and the Child Welfare League of America, which is a coalition of
public and private child welfare groups, facilitated the Indian Adoption Project.17 Both the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA), which is the federal agency responsible for the administration and
management of matters related to Alaska Natives and Native Americans, and the Children’s
Bureau, which is the federal agency responsible for improving the child welfare system, supported
this project.18 The Indian Adoption Project removed Indian children from sixteen western states
and placed the children primarily in eastern states with non-Native American/Alaska Native
families.19 Native American activists challenged the Indian Adoption Project, which non-Natives
had championed as a triumph of equality.20 In 2001, at a National Indian Child Welfare Association
(NICWA) conference in Anchorage, the Child Welfare League of America formally apologized
for its participation in the program.21 In 2000, the BIA issued a formal apology for its prior role in

11

Id. at 4.
Id.
13
Id. at 9.
14
For Native American experiences, see Mary Annette Pember, Death By Civilization, THE ATLANTIC (May 8,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/03/traumatic-legacy-indian-boarding-schools/584293/
[https://perma.cc/YM7H-5AJ8]. For Alaska Native experiences, see Diane Hirshberg & Suzanne Sharp, Thirty Years
Later: The Long-Term Effect of Boarding Schools on Alaska Natives and Their Communities, INST. OF SOC. &
ECON. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE 2, 11-13 (2005), available at
https://iseralaska.org/static/legacy_publication_links/boardingschoolfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YBL-6UWC].
15
For Native American experiences, see Mary Annette Pember, Death By Civilization, THE ATLANTIC (May 8,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/03/traumatic-legacy-indian-boarding-schools/584293/
[https://perma.cc/4R63-JQJP]. For Alaska Native experiences, see Diane Hirshberg & Suzanne Sharp, Thirty Years
Later: The Long-Term Effect of Boarding Schools on Alaska Natives and Their Communities, INST. OF SOC. &
ECON. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE 2, 9 (2005), available at
https://iseralaska.org/static/legacy_publication_links/boardingschoolfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YJL-A9Q6].
16
La Belle, supra note 8, at 4.
17
PRESS RELEASE, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN ADOPTION PROJECT INCREASES MOMENTUM (Apr. 18,
1967), available at https://www.indianaffairs.gov/as-ia/opa/online-press-release/indian-adoption-project-increasesmomentum [https://perma.cc/ZA3R-4GCF].
18
Id.
19
Id.; see also The Adoption History Project, UNIV. OF OREGON, https://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/topics/IAP.html
(last updated Feb. 24, 2012).
20
Indian Adoption Project, UNIV. OF OREGON (last updated Feb. 24, 2012),
https://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/topics/IAP.html [https://perma.cc/T6L6-3G6M].
21
David E. Simmons, , Improving the Well-Being of American Indian and Alaska Native Children and Families
through State-Level Efforts to Improve Indian Child Welfare Act Compliance, NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N
2 (2014), available at https://www.nicwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Improving-the-Well-being-of-AmericanIndian-and-Alaska-Native-Children-and-Families.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDD8-H8P2]; see also Shay Bilchik,
Executive Director, Child Welfare League of America, Keynote Address at the National Indian Child Welfare
Association Conference: Apology from the Child Welfare League of America (Apr. 24, 2001), available at
12
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separating Indian children from their parents.22
Though the Indian Adoption Project ended in 1967, the Adoption Resource Exchange of
North America (ARENA) began in 1966.23 ARENA was established by the Child Welfare League
of America.24 ARENA continued to remove Native American and Alaska Native children, in
addition to other children, from their parents and place them for adoption in non-Native homes
through the early 1970s.25
Also in the 1970s, Congress received detailed information regarding the number of Native
American and Alaska Native children in foster homes and those who were adopted by non-Native
families.26 For example, from 1973 to 1976, 1 out of every 29.6 Alaska Native children was
adopted.27 That is a rate 4.6 times higher than for non-Native children; 93% of Alaska Native
children were adopted by non-Native families.28 Additionally, Alaska Native children were three
times more likely to be in foster care than non-Native children.29 Native American children faced
similar rates; in California, 1 out of every 26.3 Native American children was adopted.30 This was
a rate 8.4 times higher than for non-Native children, and 92.5% of Native American children in
California were adopted by non-Native families.31 The preceding statistics were “calculated on the
most conservative basis possible; . . . [and] therefore reflect the most minimal statement of the
problem.”32 Congress studied this problem for several years and held multiple congressional
hearings before enacting ICWA.
2. What ICWA Is
In 1978, Congress enacted ICWA.33 Congress has the authority to issue such a law because
of “the special relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes and their members.”34
ICWA is often misunderstood to be a race-based law.35 It derives, however, from Congress’s
constitutional authority of plenary power over Indian affairs.36 ICWA is about respecting the
https://theacademy.sdsu.edu/elearning/icwa-elearning-bias-mediacontext/story_content/external_files/ApologyCWLA.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB5G-WE8R].
22
PRESS RELEASE, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, GOVER APOLOGIZES FOR BIA’S MISDEEDS (September 8, 2000)
available at https://www.bia.gov/as-ia/opa/online-press-release/gover-apologizes-bias-misdeeds
[https://perma.cc/R3XB-6D8D].
23
UNIV. OF OREGON, supra note 20.
24
Karen Balcom, The Logic of Exchange: The Child Welfare League of America, The Adoption Resource Exchange
Movement and the Indian Adoption Project, 1958-1967, in Adoption & Culture, 5 (2007).
25
Id. See also UNIV. OF OREGON, supra note 18.
26
S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 46-50 (1977).
27
Id. at 46.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 46-47.
32
Id. at 46.
33
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63).
34
25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2018).
35
E.g., Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 at 426 (5th Cir. 2019) (discussing district court’s erroneous finding that
ICWA is a race-based law).
36
25 U.S.C. § 1901(1) (2018).
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sovereignty of tribes: specifically, a tribe’s parens patriae power over their members, most
particularly their children.37
Congress found that state agencies were removing too many Indian children from their
families, “often unwarranted,” and placing them in non-Indian families and institutions.38 ICWA
defined an “Indian child” as a person under eighteen years of age, who is unmarried, and is either
a tribal member or eligible for membership as a tribal member, and is the biological child of a
tribal member.39 ICWA defined an Indian as “any person who is a member of an Indian tribe, or
who is an Alaska Native and a member of a Regional Corporation” as demarcated in federal law.40
Indian tribes also have a federal definition.41 ICWA has many important provisions for the
protection of Indian families; for purposes of this Article, the focus is on temporary removal of an
Indian child.
The BIA issued regulations related to ICWA cases effective December 12, 2016.42 The
BIA derives authority to issue regulations from ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1952,43 and its authority to
manage Indian affairs from 25 U.S.C. § 2.44 As a federal agency interpreting federal law pursuant
to statutory authority, the BIA’s interpretations of ICWA are entitled to deference by courts.45
3. When ICWA Does and Does Not Apply
ICWA applies whenever an Indian child is the subject of a child custody proceeding.46
Child custody proceedings include “involuntary proceedings,”47 “voluntary proceedings that could
prohibit the parent or Indian custodian from regaining custody of the child upon demand,”48 and a
“proceeding involving status offenses if any part of the proceeding results in the need for
out-of-home placement of a child,” including foster care.49 Status offenses are offenses that would

37

See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(3)-(4) (2018). See also WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE
10 WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DECIDED 226, 230 (Trade Paperback ed., Fulcrum Publishing) 2010.
38
25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (2018).
39
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2018).
40
25 U.S.C. § 1903(3) (2018).
41
See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (2018) (defining Indian tribe as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group
or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their
status as Indians, including any Alaska Native village…”).
42
Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 114, 38,778 (June 14, 2016). Codified at 25 C.F.R. 23.1-23.4.
43
25 U.S.C. § 1952 (2018) provides:
Within one hundred and eighty days after November 8, 1978, the Secretary shall promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
44
25 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) provides:
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and
agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian
affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian relations.
45
E.g., Chevron v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should
be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the
principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”) (citations omitted).
46
25 C.F.R. § 23.103 (2020).
47
25 C.F.R. § 23.103(a)(1)(i) (2020).
48
25 C.F.R. § 23.103(a)(1)(ii) (2020).
49
25 C.F.R. § 23.103(a)(1)(iii) (2020).
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not be considered a crime if committed by an adult, such as truancy or incorrigibility.50 A “child
custody proceeding” includes a “foster care placement,” which is defined as:
any action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for
temporary placement in a foster home or institution ... where the parent or Indian
custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights
have not been terminated[.]51
ICWA does not provide a definition of institution.52 Both Black’s Law Dictionary53 and the
Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary54 definitions of institution include facilities for the treatment of
individuals with health conditions; Black’s Law Dictionary specifically references individuals who
need treatment for mental illness. Moreover, ICWA’s legislative history reveals that the general
term institution was meant to encompass residential facilities for the treatment of an individual’s
mental health. A prior draft described institutions as “including but not limited to a correctional
facility, institution for juvenile delinquents, mental hospital, or halfway house[.]”55 Most juvenile
delinquency actions were explicitly removed from ICWA at the request of the U.S. Department of
the Interior.56 But the U.S. Department of the Interior did not object to the inclusion of mental
health facilities.57 And unlike juvenile delinquency, mental health facilities were never explicitly
removed from the definition of a foster care placement.58 The legislative history of ICWA is replete
with examples of institution having a broad inclusivity.59

50

25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2020).
25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i) (2018). Emphasis added.
52
See 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (2018) and 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2020).
53
Institution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
54
Institution, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY (Last accessed Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/institution [https://perma.cc/A8CF-VY3X].
55
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong.
32 (1977) (emphasis added).
56
H.R. Rep No. 95-1386 at 31 (1978). Cf. Hearing on the Oversight of the Indian Child Welfare Act Before the S.
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 96th Cong. 72-73 (1980) (“Every tribal social worker and program administrator
surveyed stated that Indian juvenile delinquency is a problem of great concern to the tribes. Every social worker
commented on the absence of legal authority to intervene in state juvenile court proceedings and stated that the lack
of resources and remedial services, for Indian youth and their families s inhibits tribes from actively working on
such cases even where the state juvenile justice system is willing to cooperate.”)
57
H.R. Rep No. 95-1386 at 31 (1978).
58
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, Department of Interior,
Guideline B-3 (1979) (repealed 2015). See also 25 C.F.R. § 23.103(b) (2020).
59
See e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th
Cong. 1 (1977) (“institutions (including boarding schools)”); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearing on S. 1214
Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th
Cong. 76 (1978) (testimony of Mona Shepherd, social service coordinator, Rosebud Sioux Tribe); Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the H. Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 78 (1978) (testimony of Faye La Pointe, Coordinator of Social Services
for Child Welfare, Rosebud Sioux Tribe); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the
Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 84-85
(1978) (testimony of Rena Uviller, director, Juvenile Rights Project, American Civil Liberties Union).
51
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ICWA also provides clarification on what it means for a parent to have their child returned
upon demand: “Upon demand means that the parent or Indian custodian can regain custody simply
upon verbal request, without any formalities or contingencies.”60 “Voluntary proceeding” is
defined as “a proceeding for foster-care … that either parent, both parents, or the Indian custodian
has, of … their free will, without a threat of removal by a State agency, consented to for the Indian
child.”61 ICWA applies to emergency proceedings, which will be discussed in detail in Section A.
5. infra.62
Because ICWA is a response to the unnecessary removal of children from their families
primarily by state agencies,63 ICWA does not apply to certain proceedings. ICWA does not apply
to tribal court proceedings,64 “a proceeding regarding a criminal act that is not a status offense,”65
a custody proceeding of an Indian child between the child’s parents,66 or a “voluntary placement”
chosen by the parents.67
4. What ICWA Does
ICWA provides specific safeguards for parents, Indian custodians, and tribes when Indian
children are at risk of removal or are removed from their families and tribes. Absent an emergency,
which is discussed in Section I.A.5. infra, the party seeking to involuntarily remove an Indian child
must show by clear and convincing evidence, including the testimony of a qualified expert witness,
that removal of the child from the child’s parents or Indian custodian is necessary to prevent serious
emotional or physical damage to the child before a court can issue an order for a foster care
placement of the child.68 Who may serve as a qualified expert witness is discussed infra in Sections
II. and III.D.
At least ten days before a hearing occurs regarding involuntary removal, the party seeking
to remove an Indian child must notify the parents, Indian custodians, and tribe.69 The hearing shall
be delayed an extra 20 days at the request of a parent, Indian custodian, or tribe.70 The parents or
Indian custodian, if determined by the court to be indigent, are entitled to court-appointed counsel
in any removal proceeding.71 The court may appoint counsel to the child if the court finds such an
appointment is in the child’s best interests.72
In addition to the safeguards when an Indian child is at risk of involuntary removal, ICWA
also provides protections for Indian families when the parent initially agreed to a voluntary foster
60

25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2020).
Id.
62
25 C.F.R. § 23.103(a)(2) (2020).
63
25 U.S.C. § 1901-1902 (2018).
64
25 C.F.R. § 23.103(b)(1) (2020).
65
25 C.F.R. § 23.103(b)(2) (2020).
66
25 C.F.R. § 23.103(b)(3) (2020).
67
25 C.F.R. § 23.103(b)(4) (2020).
68
25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (2018).
69
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2018).
70
Id.
71
25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (2018).
72
Id.
61
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care placement if that action could prohibit the parent or Indian custodian from regaining custody
of the child upon demand.73 For example, an Indian parent may want their child to receive inpatient
mental health care, and welcome state assistance in navigating the complexities of receiving aid
through Medicaid and the Indian Health Service.74
One important protection is that the federal regulations require that state courts must verify
on record whether the child is an Indian child or there is reason to believe the child is an Indian
child.75 If there is reason to believe the child is an Indian child, state courts “must ensure that the
party seeking placement has taken steps to verify the child’s status,”76 including contacting the
tribe that the child is believed to be a member of or is eligible for membership in.77 State courts
must ensure that an Indian child’s placement complies with the federal regulations.78
Further, ICWA requires that the Indian child who was voluntarily removed must be returned
to the parent or Indian custodian when the parent withdraws their consent either through a written
document filed with the court, testimony to the court, or another available method pursuant to state
law.79 The court “must ensure that the Indian child is returned to that parent or Indian custodian as
soon as practicable.”80
The Indian child’s tribe has the right to intervene as a party in a state child custody
proceeding for a foster care placement.81 The BIA has provided technical guidance for how state
courts should determine which tribe is the Indian child’s tribe for purposes of ICWA if an Indian
child is eligible for or is a member of multiple tribes.82 The tribe’s intervention authorizes the tribe,
as a party, to receive and examine documents in the court’s file in any proceeding for a foster care
placement.83
Tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings involving Indian children in state court
if the child resides or is domiciled on the reservation, absent when jurisdiction is vested in the State
by federal law (i.e., an emergency).84 If an Indian child is a ward of the tribal court, the tribe retains
exclusive jurisdiction regardless of where the child is domiciled.85
Tribes, parents, and Indian custodians can petition in state court proceedings to transfer

73

25 U.S.C. § 1913(b) (2018). See also 25 C.F.R. § 23.103(a)(2) (2020).
The issue of parents agreeing to foster care for their children to receive better mental health services is beyond the
scope of this article. Texas passed a bill to assist parents in this situation. The text of the bill is available at:
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/84R/billtext/html/SB01889I.htm. See also bill analysis, available at:
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/84R/analysis/html/SB01889F.htm. While this assistance is helpful, the larger issue
of insufficient mental health services looms.
75
25 C.F.R. § 23.124(a) (2020).
76
25 C.F.R. § 23.124(b) (2020).
77
Id.
78
25 C.F.R. § 23.124(c) (2020).
79
25 C.F.R. § 23.127(b) (2020). See also 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b) (2018).
80
25 C.F.R. § 23.127(c) (2020). See also 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b) (2018).
81
25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (2018).
82
25 C.F.R. § 23.109 (2020).
83
25 U.S.C. § 1912(c) (2018).
84
25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2018).
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jurisdiction from the state to the tribe.86 A state court shall transfer the proceeding to the tribe
absent good cause, an objection by either parent, or declination of the tribe.87
The tribal right to jurisdiction is important because the United States explicitly recognizes
each tribe’s sovereignty and the powers inherent with such sovereignty.88 Without this clear
directive, state power can harm tribes.89 For example, prior to ICWA’s enactment, New Mexico
acknowledged that a grandfather had a right to custody of his grandson under Navajo custom. 90
The court, however, declined to apply Navajo law in New Mexico, and a non-Indian family
adopted the child.91 After ICWA, a tribe can request jurisdiction, and the court shall transfer the
proceeding to the tribe absent limited exceptions.92
ICWA is a floor, not a ceiling, for establishing protections for Indian families.93 Some states
have adopted statutes to provide additional protections and clarification for Indian families.94
ICWA requires that the higher standard between federal and state law for protecting the rights of
the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child shall control in a child custody proceeding. 95
Thus, providing ICWA’s full protections requires a knowledge of state law as well.
5. ICWA’s Application in an Emergency
Civil commitment proceedings frequently begin as emergencies. As such, ICWA’s
provisions governing emergencies warrant special attention. ICWA applies to emergency
proceedings.96 “Emergency proceeding means and includes any court action that involves an
emergency removal or emergency placement of an Indian child.”97 ICWA authorizes the
temporary suspension of its full protections, however, if state law warrants an emergency removal
of an Indian child; though the authorization is limited only to removal necessary “to prevent
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imminent physical damage or harm to the child.”98 ICWA states that if a petitioner improperly
removes an Indian child, then the state court “shall decline jurisdiction … and shall forthwith
return the child to his parent or Indian custodian” unless the child would face a “substantial and
immediate danger or threat of such danger.”99
The applicable federal regulation governing emergencies is 25 C.F.R. § 23.113: “Any
emergency removal … of an Indian child … must terminate immediately when removal … is no
longer necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child.”100 The state court
must make a finding on the record that emergency removal is necessary to prevent such harm.101
The state court is required to continuously evaluate whether the Indian child can be returned when
new information indicates that the emergency has ended.102
An emergency proceeding can be terminated one of three ways: 1) by initiating full child
custody proceedings within the breadth of ICWA protections,103 2) by transferring jurisdiction to
the appropriate tribe,104 or 3) by restoring the child to the parent.105 At any hearing during an
emergency proceeding, a state court must “determine whether the emergency removal or
placement is no longer necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child”106
and “immediately terminate (or ensure that the agency immediately terminates) the emergency
proceeding once the court or agency possesses sufficient evidence to determine that the removal
or placement is no longer necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child.”107
Agency is defined as “a non-profit, for-profit, or governmental organization and its
employees, agents, or officials that performs, or provides services to biological parents, foster
parents, or adoptive parents to assist in the administrative and social work necessary for foster,
pre-adoptive, or adoptive placements.”108 The regulations refer to the “agency” that assumed
emergency custody.109 The BIA purposefully issued a wide-ranging definition of agency to
“comport[] with [ICWA’s] broad language imposing requirements on ‘any party’ seeking
placement of a child.”110 In matters where the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction, the agency
responsible for removing the child must provide a detailed explanation of what efforts are made to
transfer jurisdiction of the matter back to the tribe.111
Congress placed a high bar on agencies and courts when it adopted the “imminent
physical damage or harm” standard because emergency proceedings do not have the same
98
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substantive and procedural protections as other types of child custody proceedings within
ICWA.112 This standard “focuses on the child’s health, safety, and welfare” and includes
circumstances such as “sexual abuse, domestic violence, or child labor exploitation.”113 This
standard also emphasizes imminence “because the immediacy of the threat is what allows the State
to temporarily suspend the initiation of a full ‘child-custody proceeding’ subject to ICWA.”114
The BIA commented on the distinction between emergencies and non-emergencies: when
harm is not “imminent,” “issues that might at some point in the future affect the Indian child’s
welfare may be addressed either without removal or with removal on a non-emergency basis
(complying with the Act’s section 1912 requirements).”115 In other words, absent an emergency,
a court cannot order an Indian child’s removal from their parents unless several criteria are met:
1) the parents, Indian custodian, and tribe received notice of the proceedings, 2) the parents and
Indian custodian received court-appointed counsel if they are indigent, and 3) the moving party
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, including the testimony of a qualified expert
witness, that removal of the child from the child’s parents or Indian custodian is necessary to
prevent serious emotional or physical damage to the child.116
B. State Court Civil Commitment Proceedings
1. The Road to Modern Civil Commitment Proceedings
Individuals with mental illness who faced civil commitment endured myriad hardships
before the advent of modern proceedings.117 From the 19th century to the mid-20th century, it was
common practice to institutionalize people with mental illnesses long-term because the assumption
was that people with mental illness would benefit from inpatient care.118 But medical care at that
time comprised of restraints, sedation, and experimentation with different drugs.119 Legal
protections were often scarce. The prevailing requirements were only that a person presented with
a mental illness, and that treatment was expected to help; often the individual had no right to due
process.120 Individuals who were released faced the loss of their civil rights, including custody of
their children.121
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In the mid-20th century, a confluence of factors spurred reform.122 The 1950s saw the
creation of the first class of effective antipsychotic medication.123 The medication allowed certain
individuals to be treated on an outpatient basis.124 By 1960, institutions were being widely
criticized as outdated because of the option to treat an individual with medication and outpatient
services.125 Additionally, 1960 saw the creation of Medicare and Medicaid; institutions, which
were historically privately funded, now received federal funds, and the public was concerned about
the cost versus the benefit of institutional care.126 In 1963, President John F. Kennedy signed the
Community Mental Health Centers Act, which transitioned patients from institutions to outpatient
care.127 Finally, advocates for reform, including patients, sought less restrictive options for
individuals with mental illness.128 Deinstitutionalization had begun.129
2. The United States Supreme Court Issues Minimum Protective Standards for
Individuals Facing Civil Commitment
Though state law governs much of civil commitment jurisprudence, there are several
overarching United States Supreme Court decisions that inform the minimum protective standards
required under the United States Constitution for individuals facing civil commitment. In the
1970s, the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the state’s interest in civil
commitment,130 what burden of proof is required to deprive a person of their liberty,131 what kind
of conduct the petitioner must prove in order to deprive a person of their liberty,132 and with regard
to children, what level of procedural due process is necessary.133
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a. Minimum Constitutional Federal Protective Standards for Adults
A person facing an involuntary civil commitment to a state mental health hospital has a
right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.134 In
Addington v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court addressed both the state’s interest in civilly
committing an individual and the standard of proof necessary to commit an individual against their
will.135 The Court recognized the state’s legitimate interest in the involuntary civil commitment of
an individual with a mental illness in certain circumstances: under the state’s police power if the
individual is dangerous, or under the state’s parens patriae power if the individual is unable to
care for themselves.136 Those powers, however, must be balanced against the individual’s right to
liberty.
The individual facing the involuntary civil commitment should not equally bear the risk of
error with the state since an erroneous finding against an individual – the loss of the individual’s
liberty – is much more severe than an erroneous finding against the state; thus, the standard of
proof must be higher than preponderance of the evidence (at least 51% likely to be true).137
The Court also declined to find that the burden should be beyond a reasonable doubt; it is
questionable whether the state could meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard given that
psychiatry “turns on the meaning of the facts”138 as opposed to the straightforward question of
criminal law – whether the accused committed the act alleged.139 In addition to the practical
problems, the Court also found that the importance of the burden on the state, which prevents both
wrongful stigma and loss of liberty, is not completely analogous between criminal law and
involuntary civil commitment.140
The Court then considered the standard of clear and convincing evidence, which the Court
found establishes “a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns
of the state.”141 As such, the Court held that the standard of proof for individuals facing an
involuntary civil commitment is a “burden equal to or greater than the ‘clear and convincing’
standard” to be determined by state law.142
In O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Court addressed what conduct the state must prove to
involuntarily commit an individual. It held that a state cannot involuntarily commit “a
non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving in freedom by himself or with the help of
willing and responsible family members or friends.”143 The Court noted that the state has a “proper
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (“This Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for
any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection. See, e.g., Jackson v.
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interest in providing care and assistance to the unfortunate,”144 but the “mere presence of mental
illness” does not support confining an individual to an institution if the person can live safely in
their community.145 Further, “incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the
living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of
family or friends.”146
b. Minimum Constitutional Federal Protective Standards for Children
In short succession, the United States Supreme Court expanded the rights of adults facing
involuntary civil commitment and clarified the standards regarding the state’s parens patriae and
police powers. But it was unclear to what extent those rulings applied to children facing civil
commitment. In Parham v. J.R., children in Georgia brought a class action lawsuit arguing that
their constitutional right to liberty had been deprived without procedural due process; the children
had been committed to the various Georgia psychiatric hospitals because their parents or the state
child welfare agency enrolled the children as voluntary patients.147 The United States Supreme
Court, which applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge,148 held that:
[W]e must consider first the child’s interest in not being committed. Normally,
however, since this interest is inextricably linked with the parents’ interest in and
obligation for the welfare and health of the child, the private interest at stake is a
combination of the child’s and parents’ concerns. Next, we must examine the
State’s interest in the procedures it has adopted for commitment and treatment of
children. Finally, we must consider how well Georgia’s procedures protect against
arbitrariness in the decision to commit a child to a state mental hospital.149
For the first factor, the Court noted it is undisputed that a child, like an adult, “has a
substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment[.]”150 The
Court also noted it is undisputed that “the state’s involvement in the commitment decision
constitutes a state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.”151
The Court bifurcated the roles of natural parents and state child welfare agencies. The Court
found that natural parents “retain a substantial … role in the decision, absent a finding of neglect
or abuse”152 and that parents should be considered as acting in the child’s best interests.153 As such,
144
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the Court held that natural parents “retain plenary authority to seek such care for their children,
subject to a physician’s independent examination and medical judgment.”154
For state child welfare agencies, the Court found that “having custody and control of the
child in loco parentis155 [state child welfare agencies have] a duty to consider the best interest of
the child with respect to a decision on commitment to a mental hospital.”156 The Court discounted
the idea that the Georgia state child welfare agency will not act in a child’s best interests since
Georgia’s state statute provided that presumption and no party “questioned the validity of the
statutory presumption that the State acts in the child’s best interests.”157 The Court did
“acknowledge the risk of [a child] being ‘lost in the shuffle,’” but found that whether a child under
the care of a state child welfare agency has been given less protection than children with natural
parents was a question to be answered on remand.158
For the second factor, the Court considered two issues. Initially, it expressed concern that
natural parents acting in good faith would not seek treatment for their children “if such care is
contingent on participation in an adversary proceeding designed to probe their motives and other
private family matters in seeking the voluntary admission.”159 The Court also found that the state
“has a genuine interest in allocating priority to the diagnosis and treatment of patients as soon as
they are admitted to a hospital rather than to time-consuming procedural minutes before the
admission.”160 Both considerations weighed in favor of less protections for children than adults.
For the third factor, the Court held that an inquiry of “some kind”161 by a neutral factfinder
is required to make sure the statutory requirements for admission are met.162 It reached that
conclusion by considering “what process adequately protects the child’s constitutional rights by
reducing risks of error without unduly trenching on traditional parental authority,” and without
interfering with the legitimate interests of the state.163 The Court also held that “it is necessary that
the child’s continuing need for commitment be reviewed periodically by a similarly independent
procedure.”164 It noted that the neutral factfinder did not have to be a judicial or administrative
officer, but could be an independent medical expert.165 A formal, or even quasi-formal, adversary
hearing is not required.166 States, however, can choose to require such a hearing.167 In other words,
federal law does not require a hearing, but state law can. The Court emphasized that “procedural
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due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to
the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”168
C. Siloed State Examples: Alaska and Washington
Though individual states are not required to provide a court proceeding for a child’s civil
commitment,169 states can choose to do so. States can also expand rights to Indian families and
tribes.170 Alaska and Washington provide good examples of the siloed state because of their civil
commitment statutes and experience with the Indian Child Welfare Act.
Alaska provides several rights for children facing civil commitment, including the right to
a state court proceeding.171 Alaska is also home to 229 federally recognized Indian tribes172 and is
no stranger to applying ICWA in state court proceedings when the state’s child welfare agency
seeks the removal of an Indian child.173 Yet Alaska’s statutes and rules are silent as to ICWA’s
application for Indian children in the context of a civil commitment.174
Similarly, Washington provides the right to a hearing for children facing involuntary civil
commitment.175 Washington, home to twenty-nine federally recognized Indian tribes,176 enacted a
state ICWA to further protect the rights of Indian families and tribes.177 The statutes, however,
are in the juvenile court section of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW),178 and the RCW
governing mental health does not include a reference to ICWA.179 Washington’s Mental
Proceedings Rule (MPR) also makes no reference to ICWA.180 Since each state’s laws will vary,
the next section discusses the harm of isolating these two practices through the federal legal
framework.
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II. THE CURRENT SILOED PRACTICE: FAILING TO APPLY ICWA TO STATE COURT CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS OF INDIAN CHILDREN HARMS INDIAN FAMILIES AND TRIBES
By acknowledging ICWA’s application in child welfare proceedings, but not for civil
commitments, states cause harm to Indian children, their parents, and their Tribes. Most
commonly, ICWA is applied in state court proceedings regarding child welfare, in hearings more
commonly known as “abuse and neglect” or dependency actions. ICWA, however, applies in other
state court proceedings as well. ICWA applies to any action to remove an Indian child for a foster
care placement, which includes an institution, if the action means the parent or Indian custodian
cannot have the child back upon demand.181 The BIA issued federal regulations clarifying that this
includes truancy actions,182 voluntary proceedings,183 and emergency proceedings,184 if it could
result in the removal of an Indian child. Recall the reasons that Congress enacted ICWA outlined
in Section I.A.1. supra: ICWA exists because of the “alarmingly high percentage of Indian families
… broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children,”185 and that states handling
child custody proceedings have historically been unsuccessful at recognizing indigenous culture
and its impact on Indian communities.186 The reasons Congress enacted ICWA are sharply
reflected in civil commitment proceedings because Indian children are being removed from their
parents, Indian custodians, and tribes without the full protections of ICWA.187
Because of the United State Supreme Court’s decision in Parham,188 there is no guarantee
that Indian children facing involuntary civil commitment are receiving court oversight. One of
ICWA’s protections is that it requires that the state official or agency terminate an emergency
proceeding when it is no longer necessary.189 To enforce this provision, the BIA requires the court
to monitor the agency.190 The BIA defines agency as “a non-profit, for-profit, or governmental
organization and its employees, agents, or officials that performs, or provides services to biological
parents, foster parents, or adoptive parents to assist in the administrative and social work necessary
for foster, pre-adoptive, or adoptive placements.”191
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There is no indication that courts are currently treating psychiatric hospitals or mental
health professionals petitioning for civil commitment as meeting the definition of agency.192 But
it is reasonable to interpret agency to include the psychiatric hospital or mental health professionals
because foster care placement includes any action to place an Indian child in an institution.193
Indeed, the BIA only excludes attorneys and law firms from the definition of agency.194 It is true
that the definition of agency states that it provides or performs services to the parents as opposed
to the child; if a child is receiving inpatient care, however, any psychiatric facility or mental health
professional treating that child is presumably providing services to the parents as well as the child,
such as visitation during the inpatient period and coordinating outpatient care for discharge
planning.195 And consider ICWA’s explicit application to truancy,196 which is a youth’s unexcused
absence from school.197 Truancy, like residential psychiatric care, can be premised on the actions
of the child, but involves services to the parents.198
ICWA’s protections regarding evidence are also unlikely being adhered to in current civil
commitment proceedings.199 It is true that the burden of proof – clear and convincing evidence –
regarding the temporary removal of the Indian child for an involuntary civil commitment and a
non-emergency action to place an Indian child in an institution under ICWA would likely be the
same in a state court proceeding.200 However, there is a difference in the evidence required.
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In an involuntary civil commitment, the evidence generally must show that the person has
a mental illness and cannot live outside the facility “nondangerously.”201 The focus is on the
individual’s mental illness and its manifestations, such as whether the individual has attempted
self-harm. In an emergency proceeding regarding the involuntary removal of an Indian child, the
evidence must show that the child would face imminent harm if left in the care of the parent or
Indian custodian.202 The focus is usually on the parents’ conduct, such as whether the child has
been neglected to the point that the government must intervene to prevent the impending harm.
Emergency proceedings involving an Indian child should last no longer than thirty days, 203 at
which point full ICWA protections – including the higher requirements for removal – should begin
if an Indian child has not been returned to the child’s parent or Indian custodian, or jurisdiction
has not been transferred to the child’s tribe.204 In a non-emergency state proceeding regarding the
involuntary removal of an Indian child, the evidence must show that removal of the child from the
child’s parents or Indian custodian is necessary to prevent serious emotional or physical damage
to the child, including the testimony of a qualified expert witness.205
Pursuant to ICWA, a qualified expert witness must be qualified to testify on the causal
connection between the child’s continued custody by the parent or Indian custodian and the serious
emotional or physical damage that is likely to happen to the child due to the parent’s conduct. 206
Further, the qualified expert witness should be qualified to testify as to the prevailing social and
cultural standards of the Indian child’s tribe.207 Lastly, federal regulations state that “[t]he social
worker regularly assigned to the Indian child may not serve as a qualified expert witness in
child-custody proceedings concerning the child.”208 By contrast, the mental health professional in
a civil commitment proceeding has no statutory requirement to be knowledgeable about the
individual’s culture or situation.209 It is true that the mental health professional must speak to the
less restrictive alternative option.210 It is likely, however, that without cultural competence a
mental health professional will not consider a potential less restrictive alternative; for instance, the
mental health professional may value Western models of treatment over indigenous models.211
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Beyond the question of agency and evidentiary issues, ICWA also provides protections for
Indian families; some of the protections, however, are not necessarily provided for in a state’s
proceedings governing civil commitment of a child.212 First, indigent parents and Indian custodians
are entitled to court-appointed counsel in any involuntary proceeding to remove an Indian child.213
The state court can also provide the child counsel if it is in the child’s best interests. 214 Second,
depending on the facts of the case, tribes have exclusive215 or concurrent216 jurisdiction over
children of their tribe, and as such, can move to have the Indian child’s case transferred to tribal
jurisdiction.217 Third, tribes can intervene as a party to a state court proceeding.218 The party status
gives tribes a right to “timely examine all report and other documents … upon which any decision”
that could result in a temporary removal of the Indian child by the court may be based.219
ICWA also provides protections for Indian families when the parent initially agreed to a
voluntary proceeding for a foster care placement, but that action could prohibit the parent or Indian
custodian from regaining custody of the child upon demand.220 For example, a parent may agree
to a voluntary proceeding for a foster care placement in a psychiatric treatment center because the
parent believes the child needs that specialized care. In state proceedings for voluntary removal of
an Indian child, ICWA requires that the Indian child must be returned to the parent or Indian
custodian when the parent withdraws their consent either through a written document filed with
the court, through testimony to the court, or another available method pursuant to state law.221 The
court “must ensure that the Indian child is returned to that parent or Indian custodian as soon as
practicable.”222 Continuing the example, say the parent files a written request to withdraw their
child, but the psychiatric treatment center considers the withdrawal to be medical neglect. If the
practitioners are unfamiliar with ICWA, the parent may not have their child returned to them. If
ICWA is applied correctly, the psychiatric center has two options if it sincerely believes the child
needs treatment: file an emergency petition if they think the situation so merits, or return the child
and file a non-emergency petition for treatment.223
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Civil commitment proceedings are often confidential.224 Without the enforcement of these
rights in civil commitment proceedings, tribes may not be able to locate their members – or the
wards of their courts.225 Parents and non-parental custodians may wrongfully have their children
removed based on a cultural misunderstanding. Indian custodians may not be recognized at all.
Consider: an Indian youth, raised by her Indian grandmother since shortly after her birth, is initially
brought by a friend to a psychiatric hospital due to suicidal ideation. Grandmother is an Indian
custodian by tribal custom.226 But the psychiatric hospital and the state court who are unfamiliar
with ICWA only attempt to notify the Indian youth’s parents, who they cannot locate.
Grandmother is frantic because she does not know where her granddaughter is, and no agency will
confirm or deny they have seen her because grandmother does not have any court-ordered
guardianship. These are all unforced errors: such unnecessary trauma is avoidable.
III. END THE SILO AND PROMOTE INTERDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE CONSISTENT WITH CONGRESS’S
INTENT TO PROTECT INDIAN FAMILIES AND TRIBES: APPLY ICWA TO STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
REGARDING CIVIL COMMITMENTS OF INDIAN CHILDREN
ICWA was enacted for the benefit of Indians.227 Its attendant federal regulations are issued
in consideration of “the canon of construction, applied by Federal courts, that Federal statutes
should be liberally construed in favor of Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted for their
benefit.”228 The BIA published extensive commentary on situations that trigger ICWA’s
application: when there is an action that may culminate in a foster care placement, which includes
placing a child in an institution;229 and in emergency situations.230 As such, it is reasonable to apply
ICWA to state court proceedings for the civil commitment of Indian children given the plain
language of ICWA: that Indian children cannot be forcibly removed from their parents and tribe
to be placed in an institution until specific criteria are met.231

224

E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.845 (2020).
In re Gabriella B., Supreme Court Nos. S-17022/S-17122, 2019 WL 2880964 (Alaska 2019).
226
25 U.S.C. § 1903(6) (2018).
227
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-3 (2018).
228
Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 114, 38785 (June 14, 2016) (citing Montana v. Blackfeet
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005)).
229
Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 114, 38799 (June 14, 2016). See also Section I. A. 3. supra.
230
Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 114, 38816-38821 (June 14, 2016). See also 25 U.S.C. §
1922 (2018) and 25 C.F.R. § 23.113 (2020).
231
25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (2018) (for non-emergencies); 25 U.S.C. § 1922 (2018) (for emergencies). See also 25
U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i) (2018) (defining “foster care placement” to include placement of an Indian child in an
institution).
225

127

A. An Interdisciplinary Checklist for Practitioners in State Court Civil Commitment Proceedings
ICWA creates limits on the removal of Indian children for the protection of Indian children,
their parents, and their tribes. ICWA imposes four initial duties that would apply in any state court
civil commitment proceeding involving a child. First, determine if there is reason to believe the
child is an Indian child, which triggers ICWA’s application.232 Second, determine whether notice
has been provided to the parents and tribe.233 Third, determine the appointment of counsel for the
parents, Indian custodian, and child if it is in the child’s best interests.234 Fourth, determine whether
the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction of the child.235
These duties must be considered for two reasons. As an initial matter, ICWA and the
federal regulations governing its enforcement control over a state’s statutes and case law because
of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.236 A state’s civil commitment statutes
may not provide the protections for parents and children that are in ICWA. Indeed, state laws
regarding civil commitment are unlikely to provide protections to tribes that are ascribed in
ICWA.237 Finally, if a state court proceeding does not provide ICWA’s protections regarding
jurisdiction and removal then the child, parent, Indian custodian, or tribe may petition “any court
of competent jurisdiction” to invalidate that state court action.238 These duties are not a high burden
to the court. It would primarily be an additional inquiry of the court to the petitioner at the outset
of the proceeding.
Two subsequent duties provide further protections for Indian children, parents, and their
tribes by ensuring that Indian children are only removed from their parents if the party seeking
removal can meet the high legal burden. Initially, if the proceeding qualifies as an emergency, then
the court must monitor the emergency, specifically focusing on a method to end the emergency.239
Moreover, in either a method to end the emergency or in non-emergency situations, the court must
determine whether the party seeking removal of the Indian child from their parent has met their
burden of clear and convincing evidence, including the testimony of a qualified expert witness,
that continued custody of the child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child.240
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B. The Checklist in Action: The Four Initial Duties
The first duty is to ascertain whether ICWA applies. ICWA applies to a state court civil
commitment proceeding if the child at issue is an Indian child and the proceeding may result in
removal of the child for placement in an institution.241 The federal regulations issued by the BIA
provide guidance for courts on how to determine if the child is an Indian child.242 For instance, the
court must inquire whether there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child, and the parties’
responses must be on record.243 If there is reason to know the child may be an Indian child, then
the court must treat the child as an Indian child until the court receives information confirming that
the child does not meet the definition of an Indian child.244
The second and third duties are straightforward. The court must determine that parties
entitled to notice received it.245 The court must appoint counsel for indigent parents.246 The court
may also appoint counsel for the child.247
The fourth duty is to determine whether the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over the
248
child. It is imperative that a state court proceeding address jurisdiction immediately. It is true
that states can take action to protect an Indian child in an emergency. 249 If a tribe has exclusive
jurisdiction, however, ICWA does not allow a state to maintain an emergency proceeding except
for the time necessary to effectuate the transfer of the Indian child back to their tribe.250
After these four duties are completed, the judicial officer can determine whether the state
court action should continue. If so, this triggers subsequent duties under ICWA to determine
whether the Indian child can be removed from their parents.
C. The Checklist in Action: The Subsequent Duty to End the Emergency
One of ICWA’s primary principles is that removal of an Indian child from their parent shall
not happen until after a court hears clear and convincing evidence, including the testimony of a
qualified expert witness, that removal of the child from the child’s parents or Indian custodian is
necessary to prevent serious emotional or physical damage to the child.251 ICWA authorizes an
exception, however, for emergencies.252
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In order to constitute an emergency under ICWA, an Indian child must be at risk of
imminent physical damage or harm.253 What constitutes imminent physical damage or harm is
defined under state law.254
Certainly, it is possible for the same conduct to qualify as an emergency removal pursuant
to ICWA and an emergency commitment proceeding for mental health purposes. Recall the United
States Supreme Court’s ruling in O’Connor v. Donaldson that a state cannot involuntarily commit
“a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving in freedom by himself or with the help of
willing and responsible family members or friends.”255 One example could be that an Indian child
attempted suicide. Such acute behavior, depending on the circumstances, could constitute both
imminent harm to the child as a danger to oneself based on the child’s mental health.
Continuing with this example, an emergency state court civil commitment proceeding
regarding an Indian child who is involuntarily committed for a suicide attempt would be subject
to ICWA. ICWA requires that the state court work to end the emergency.256
An emergency should not extend beyond 30 days.257 The state court must promptly hold a
hearing when there is new information the emergency may have ended.258 There are three ways to
end an emergency.259
First, the state court can provide full protections under ICWA.260 Full protections of ICWA
include the higher standard for removal of an Indian child: clear and convincing evidence,
including the testimony of a qualified expert witness, that removal of the child from the child’s
parents or Indian custodian is necessary to prevent serious emotional or physical damage to the
child.261 This protection is discussed in detail infra Section III.D.
Second, the state court can transfer the Indian child to tribal jurisdiction.262 This would
include either the tribe’s exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.263 It is the state court’s responsibility
to timely contact the tribal court in writing to see if the tribal court wants to decline the transfer.264
Third, the state court can restore the Indian child to their parent.265 This option is intended
for when the safety threat that caused the emergency is over.266 Returning to the example of an
Indian child who attempted suicide, a parent may argue in the state court civil commitment
proceeding that the acute nature of the suicide attempt has ameliorated as both the impulse has
passed and the parent has made arrangements to treat their child’s mental health. When there is a
253
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dispute between the parent and the petitioner, courts place heavy emphasis on the qualified expert
witness.267
D. The Checklist in Action: The Subsequent Duty to Ensure Removal Only Happens if a
Qualified Expert Witness Testifies
As either a cure for the emergency, or in a non-emergency situation, the party seeking
removal of the Indian child from their parent must present clear and convincing evidence,
including the testimony of a qualified expert witness (QEW), that removal of the child from the
child’s parents or Indian custodian is necessary to prevent serious emotional or physical damage
to the child.268 The social worker regularly assigned to the Indian child may not serve as the
QEW.269 The bar on the assigned social worker serving as the QEW matters because states have
differing standards on who qualifies as a mental health professional for purposes of qualifying as
an expert witness in an involuntary civil commitment; Alaska, for example, qualifies a licensed
clinical social worker.270
The QEW must be qualified to testify regarding whether the continued custody by the
parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in that type of harm, and should be qualified to testify
as to the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian child’s tribe. 271 While practitioners
seeking removal of an Indian child are often able to retain an expert on mental health, an expert
who is also culturally competent is often lacking.272
The BIA has provided further guidance regarding when cultural competence matters. It
allows “limited circumstances” where cultural knowledge is “plainly irrelevant.” 273 But the BIA
“disagrees … with the … suggestion that State courts or agencies are well-positioned to assess
when cultural biases or lack of knowledge is, or is not, implicated. ICWA was enacted in
recognition of the fact that the opposite is generally true.”274 The BIA also highlights that “some
theories, such as certain bonding and attachment theories, presented by experts in foster-care …
proceedings are based on Western or Euro-American cultural norms and may have little
application outside that context.”275
There are major differences between Western and indigenous cultures. Indeed, one such
dissertation on the differences and its effect on mental health treatment is the Society of Indian
Psychologists’ (SIP) Commentary on the American Psychological Association’s (APA) Ethical
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, which arose because of the negative impact the
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APA’s code of ethics had for professionals working with indigenous populations.276 SIP notes
that the original ethical code was developed without input from indigenous populations.277
Furthermore, SIP delineates the differences, noting that Western values often focus on the siloed
objective individual, whereas indigenous cultures value interdisciplinary action that considers the
community.278
In addition to their overarching values, Western and indigenous cultures can vary in
treating mental health issues. Take therapy, for example. SIP’s Commentary discusses that the
APA’s ethical code on written informed consent between the patient and the professional “do[es]
not reflect the verbal nature of communication in Native communities” because many indigenous
communities are oral cultures.279 Insisting on a written document as the only way to establish
consent is a Western bias.280 SIP also notes that the APA’s ethical code regarding what is a
“recognized technique or procedure” constitutes a Western bias for two reasons: first, “recognized”
procedures are generally considered Western procedures, and second, Western approaches to
treatment can be viewed as “cold, irrelevant, and harmful” to indigenous peoples.281
Returning to the scenario where the Indian child attempted suicide, add the two issues
raised by SIP. The Indian child and her parents do not want to sign any forms. The family wants
to address the Indian child’s mental health with both outpatient therapy and traditional healing
activities, including a spiritual ceremony and subsistence gathering.
Now consider how a proposed QEW without cultural competence may view this plan.282
Such a QEW may testify that the family cannot provide the treating professional with informed
consent by refusing to sign the forms. The family’s plan does not fit into the traditional Western
model for mental health treatment. A proposed QEW without cultural competence may argue that
the parents are unfit to meet the Indian child’s medical needs because the parents do not accept the
Western standard. This is precisely what ICWA is designed to address.
In addition to specific courses of mental health treatment, recall also the history of how the
United States has treated its indigenous peoples discussed in I.A.1. supra. The assimilation of
indigenous peoples through the separation of their children from their families and tribes ran
paramount through the 1970s.283
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Include this context for the same example of the Indian child who attempted suicide. The
family also does not want the child in a locked facility hundreds of miles from their tribe, separated
from their family and culture. A proposed QEW who lacks cultural competence may view this as
medical neglect instead of what it is: a credible fear that the dominant government may separate
the child and limit the child’s interactions with their family and culture.
The Alaska Supreme Court has considered a QEW’s lack of cultural competency in the
context of a child welfare proceeding where the state child welfare agency sought to place the
Indian child in an out-of-state psychiatric treatment center.284 It unanimously held that for this
Indian child’s situation, which included suicide attempts, the QEW did not need to be culturally
competent.285 The court recognized that there are limited circumstances where cultural competence
is irrelevant, and it determined this was such a circumstance. 286 There is a wide gulf, however,
between the BIA’s example of a limited circumstance of sexual abuse by a parent 287 and the more
difficult question of a child’s mental health treatment. It is common sense to ensure that a child
will not be sexually abused by their parent. How to treat mental health needs is more complex.
The court erred when it dispensed the cultural competency requirement in this scenario.
The court also tried to find exception predicated on the Indian child’s conduct, and not on
conditions of her mother’s home.288 This is error. Unless the conduct is considered criminal, a
petitioner’s request for foster care placement based on an Indian child’s conduct still merits a
culturally competent expert.289 For example, if a petitioner seeks to remove an Indian child because
they are truant, then the petitioner’s expert should be culturally competent.290
To find exceptions to ICWA compliance when faced with difficult questions begs
revisiting why ICWA had to be passed in the first place – state agencies and courts are not
well-versed in Indian culture.291 Consider the court’s end result here: after dispensing with
ICWA’s QEW standards, an Indian child was removed from her mother’s home and placed
thousands of miles from her family and tribe in a locked facility that is acknowledged to be
culturally incompetent.292
The concurring opinion from the court, however, recognized that a QEW’s cultural
competence should not be unilaterally excluded from situations involving an Indian child’s mental
health.293 “The difficulty of these issues alone does not quash Congress’s emphasis on
contextualizing an Indian child’s needs” because “[d]oing so would emphasize [the petitioner’s]
284
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responsibility and ultimately allow courts to better, and more fairly, adjudicate difficult questions
in the spirit of ICWA’s regulations and guidelines.”294 To not hold the petitioner to its burden of a
culturally competent QEW risks “the possibility that some of” an Indian child’s “heightened needs
may be caused, or at least exacerbated by being in a facility entirely disconnected from her
culture.”295
The explicit importance of cultural competence derives from ICWA, not from civil
commitment jurisprudence.296 This underscores the importance of answering the initial question
on whether ICWA applies.297 Unless practitioners check for ICWA’s application, Indian children,
their families, and their tribes will not receive their full protections under federal law. The result
will be unnecessarily separated families, which is a serious trauma recognized by both cultures.298
This Article does not posit that the petitioner in civil commitments proceedings must incur
a new cost and burden; rather, the plain language of ICWA shows that it has always applied to
state civil commitment proceedings, and the petitioner must follow federal law. It is also possible
that the QEW and the petitioner’s witnesses would have complimentary testimony; indeed, there
are expert witnesses who would meet the criteria to testify about both why an individual needs to
be involuntarily committed and why, in the case of an Indian child, releasing the child back to their
parents or Indian custodian would be unsafe. “Regardless whether the outcome would be the same
with testimony about Native cultural and social practices, standardizing and reinforcing
expectations for culturally informed testimony would create and maintain a worthwhile
safeguard.”299
IV. CONCLUSION
It is in everyone’s best interests to ensure a child is removed only if necessary. To do
otherwise is to do harm.300 The plain language of ICWA supports its application in the context of
civil commitment proceedings of Indian children. Though ICWA’s application in child welfare
proceedings is long recognized, there is silence on ICWA’s interplay with the equally important
area of civil commitment. This Article demonstrates why ICWA matters for Indian children facing
removal from their parents or Indian custodians for placement in an institution due to a civil
commitment proceeding. The rights accorded to tribes to protect their members, also infringed
with the current siloed practice, must be recognized. The checklist provided in this Article can end
the siloes, encourage better interdisciplinary practice, and most importantly, reduce trauma for
Indian families by providing them all their rights and protections under the law.
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